T e building of biomedical innovation clusters has been a goal of many government planners. T e regions that have succeeded in these ef orts have enjoyed economic growth and high-paying jobs while attracting follow-on investments in technology. However, as the pharmaceutical industrywhich powers many of these clusters-undergoes a profound transformation, the rules for nurturing clusters are changing. In some areas, such as Sweden, England, and Quebec, industry consolidation has led large pharmaceutical companies to shutter once-productive research and development (R&D) sites and move them elsewhere. T is shuf ing has lef deep holes in the economic fabric, putting the viability of what remains in jeopardy. Yet out of this misfortune, new research models have risen that are patching the holes and reinvigorating innovation. T is Perspective describes how creative policy-making can facilitate such recovery.
CHALLENGING TIME FOR INDUSTRY
In the past 15 years, the pharmaceutical industry has transformed from an admired, thriving industry to one facing stagnant revenues along with price and intellectual property (IP) challenges. Many factors have combined to produce this reversal of fortune.
Internal challenges. R&D productivity has been on a long-term decline (1) . T e industry's struggle to improve its new drug output ( Fig. 1 ) has led many companies to consolidate work sites and abandon therapeutic areas. For instance, Pf zer closed multiple facilities, including ones in Ann Arbor, Michigan (United States), Sandwich (UK), and Singapore; AstraZeneca shuttered laboratories in Montreal (Canada), Lund (Sweden), and Bangalore (India); Roche shut down a facility in Nutley, New Jersey (United States), and Novartis ended operations in Horsham (UK).
Spread of collaborative research. T e digitization of biology and medicine has created vast opportunities to better understand diseases and design new therapies. However, much of this work has been spearheaded by academia and small companies and has resulted in increasingly complex collaboration networks among the many players engaged in biomedical research. Big Pharma has responded by externalizing a growing share of its drug discovery ef orts and refocusing internal R&D on clinical development-a change sometimes described as a "shif from bench to bedside" (2) . T is has changed innovation dynamics and moved the locus of innovation from inhouse R&D to the networks because these expanding collaborations increasingly are led intellectually by external collaborators rather than by the big pharmaceutical companies themselves (3).
Economic challenges. Patent clif s and tougher reimbursement policies have caused a steep increase in the share of prescriptions f lled by generic drugs. In the United States, that percentage has grown from 47% in 2001 to 83% in 2013 (4). To mitigate the negative impact on their revenues, pharmaceutical companies have raised prices aggressively, causing a widening gap between generic and brand prices. Since 2008, for instance, generic-drug prices in the United States have halved, whereas brand prices have doubled (5) . T is gap has accelerated the shif to generics, making a dif cult situation worse.
Policy challenges. T e high prices of many branded drugs have triggered a backlash in a growing number of countries. In some, governments have rescinded patents or used compulsory licenses to make drugs af ordable for their citizens; in others, they have used their authority as payers to curtail reimbursements. Whereas these challenges were initially limited to emerging economies, they are now spreading to developed markets such as Western Europe, Canada, and Australia.
T H E N E W RU S T B E LTS?
T ese challenges have precipitated major changes in the pharmaceutical industry. T e giant research sites that were common across leading companies-where scientists 
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Year once enjoyed serene, campus-like environments-became cathedrals built for another age. T eir internally focused designs were ill-suited to the increasingly collaborative nature of biomedical research. T ese of enconservative centers were organized around rigid processes and suf used by a lavish culture that fostered prof igate habits and lessened the incentive to change (6) .
In many cases, the new R&D leaders who were tasked with reversing the decline in productivity concluded that retooling that old infrastructure was not an option. Policymakers and civic leaders were dismayed by the closures that followed, but their reactions in dif erent parts of the world of er illuminating insights into how policy-making can turn dire situations into new opportunities.
England. For the past century, England has been a powerhouse of the pharmaceutical industry. Building on the Nobel prizewinning science of its universities, companies such as Imperial Chemical Industries, Burroughs-Wellcome, Glaxo, and Beecham invested massively in research. T ey were joined by foreign companies eager to leverage England's talented workforce. T e result was the buildup of an impressive research infrastructure that included some of the largest facilities in Europe. T ese campuses were scattered around the country, of en in isolated pastoral settings. For decades, this isolation did not matter because much of the research was performed in-house. However, as size and scale became less ef ective at fostering innovation, that infrastructure became a drag.
T e industry no longer needed giant facilities, but smaller ones, located near research universities and surrounded by a rich fabric of small companies and academic medical centers. Bold science and interaction among those involved in it had replaced economies of scale as the drivers of innovation. T e old infrastructure-likened by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) chief executive Andrew Witty to "a big pile of bricks with air conditioning" (7)-had become largely useless. P% zer closed most of its 2400-employee laboratories in Sandwich, Kent, as well as a similar facility in Groton, Connecticut, and opened a new research center in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Likewise, AstraZeneca closed its 2900-employee R&D site in Alderley Park, Cheshire, and built a new one in Cambridge, UK. T e British government and T e Wellcome Trust added their own touch by locating the new $1 billion Francis Crick Institute in Central London. When completed, it will be the third vertex of a "scienti% c 'golden triangle' whose other corners are Oxford and Cambridge" (7) . It will provide jobs to 1250 scientistsa welcome opportunity for some but only a fraction of the jobs lost in the closures.
New Jersey. T e New York City-Philadelphia corridor is the historic home of much of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. So when trouble developed, it hit the area with full force, leaving thousands of highly educated people without the comfortable incomes and job security that had been a hallmark of the industry. Unmoored, they dri$ ed toward career coaches and support groups, sharing experiences and tips to get interviews, just as new waves of layof s emptied more laboratories and plants.
Between 2007 and 2012, New Jersey and Pennsylvania shed 22,000 pharmaceutical jobs, mostly from large companies. Yet during the same time, 300 life science companies sprouted across the region. Many were contract research organizations that did work that drug companies used to do internally but are now keen to outsource to lower-cost organizations. Other companies were founded by frustrated researchers who saw a chance to pursue scienti% c ideas that their former employers would not consider. Many unemployed scientists found new jobs in those start-ups, but o$ en at lower salaries than those they used to enjoy. Some le$ the area for other states where they could secure employment in their areas of expertise. Yet, others exited the industry permanently, taking teaching positions, early retirement packages, and, sometimes, menial jobs that they needed in order to pay the bills.
Montreal. With its French roots, Englishspeaking universities, and international business community, Montreal's cosmopolitan society is the kind of environment where innovation f ourishes. Indeed, over the past century the Canadian province developed a rich cluster of leading academic and biomedical institutions along with pioneering homegrown companies. T is unique terroir attracted outside interest, and in 1965, Merck swooped in and bought Charles E. Frosst, a leading local company. Merck-Frosst went on to become a world-class R&D laboratory and the birthplace of some of its parent's bestselling drugs, including Singulair and Timoptic. Other companies followed, and by the start of the new millennium, AstraZeneca, Bristol-Myers Squibb, GSK, Johnson & Johnson, Novartis, Sano% , Shire, and Wyeth had joined more than a hundred biotechnology companies and public institutions (8) to create "a life science haven" (9) . When the innovation crisis hit, however, Montreal was not spared. Large pharmaceutical companies facing patent clif s found it hard to justify keeping R&D facilities in Montreal and nearby Boston. Many chose to consolidate on the U.S. side of the border. Merck and AstraZeneca closed their operations, and others scaled down, causing a 28% drop in the number of pharmaceutical, medical, and manufacturing jobs in Québec between 2006 and 2011 (9) .
A winning strategy: Geneva makes the right move.
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T e area's leaders were prompt to react. Recognizing that research was undergoing a radical transformation, they created institutions to keep local scientists engaged and in the vanguard of innovation. Two unusual organizations emerged: CQDM, which is focused on precompetitive research, and NEOMED, which is centered on early translation (table S1). Both have recon% gured drug R&D by enabling networks that promote collaboration and cross-pollination among academics, biotech entrepreneurs, big Pharma, and other stakeholders. And, it seems to be working. Barely 5 years a$ er the contraction of its biomedical sector, Montreal is on the rebound. Almost half of Canada's life sciences industries are concentrated there, as well as the majority of the basic and clinical research activities conducted in the country. Altogether, Montreal is now home to more than 400 companies developing over 150 products and technologies (9) .
Geneva. In 2012, Merck KGaA announced that it would close the headquarters and research center of its pharmaceutical division, Merck-Serono, in Geneva, Switzerland. Nearly 1250 employees would lose their jobs. T eir % rst reaction was to % ght and strike. But the reality quickly sunk in, and the community organized. A couple of local billionaires stepped in and joined hands with universities to acquire the facilities and create Campus Biotech SA, an ambitious public-private research center that has become the heart of the Swiss "neuroscience valley. " Half of it houses academic neuroscience research programs as well as the Wyss Institute for Bio-and Neuroengineering-which was created by a $103 million donation from Hansjörg Wyss, a medical devices entrepreneur who also funded the Wyss Institute for Biologically Inspired Engineering at Harvard University. Ernesto Bartarelli-a businessman, philanthropist, and majority owner of Serono when Merck KGaA bought it in 2007-is pitching in with several tenured positions.
T e rest of the facility will house startups, established companies, and clinical research facilities. T e idea is to create an interactive innovation ecosystem in which scientists enrich each other and spark ideas that fuel innovation. Six start-ups have been created from assets divested by MerckSerono (10). T ey are backed by a €30 million venture fund created by the company for that purpose. Campus Biotech SA is also attracting interest from other investors. So% nnova and Novo have recently teamed up to invest $34.5 million in ObsEva, a biotech company founded on Merck's former preterm labor drug research. It is too early to fully assess the success of the program, but it looks encouraging. Campus Biotech hosts more than 400 employees, a % gure that is expected to rise quickly to 600. Cutting-edge research continues to be done at the facility and in several nearby biotech communities, talent remains engaged, entrepreneurs are getting a chance to create, and funding is available to support them.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Over the past 15 years, the pharmaceutical industry has undergone a sweeping recon% guration driven by changes in science, new research models, and escalating economic pressure. Seven large pharmaceutical companies have disappeared, a number that may still rise. T e R&D model, which used to rely on large facilities staf ed by thousands of scientists, is being replaced rapidly by interconnected networks of partners anchored around major universities and medical facilities. T is redistribution of activities has not been painless. Areas such as England, where much of the research was performed away from academic medical centers, have had to write of a lot of the old infrastructure and rebuild it anew closer to the countries' leading universities. T e dislocation and job losses have been severeand the loss of talent even worse.
In retrospect, there was little that could have been done to prevent this. When the infrastructure was laid down many decades ago, there was no way to predict the present. Disruptions spawned by changes in business models happen. T e best that policy-makers can do is to avoid making them worse. In this case, that means refraining from using public funds to keep old facilities af oat and, instead, using % -nancial resources to ease the relocation of talent to the new centers. T is is not what happened in England as policy-makers and community leaders tried to so$ en the blow by creating new research jobs in the old laboratories. Recent reports suggest that these ef orts have been largely inef ective (11) .
T e situation in New Jersey is hardly better. American policy-makers' aversion to interfering with free markets le$ many jobless scientists fending for themselves while their jobs migrated to new campuses, such as New York's Alexandria Center (12) . T ose who created contract research organizations (CROs) hoped to lure business from their former employers. T is plan worked to some extent, but CROs are about cost-cutting, not innovation. Although some jobs were preserved, many of those tied to innovation moved away, dimming the state's prospects. It did not need to be so. New Jersey's pharmaceutical sector is dense enough, and the state has enough % ne universities, that it could have attempted what New York and England have done. Doing so might have been costly, but likely less so than the present value of the jobs that migrated. Montreal fared much better. In a way, it was fortunate that the lost jobs were located close to its universities and medical facilities. But it also took vision and leadership to recognize that research was changing and to create institutions that facilitated biomedical research's transition toward the new, networked model. T e result is a biomedical cluster that is well positioned relative to its competition, and its recent performance seems to validate the choices that were made. Another remarkable factor in the Montreal experience has been the lack of acrimony as the various stakeholders worked together to pull through a dif cult situation. Even the companies that moved away kept a stake in the area by % nancially supporting and advising CQDM and NEOMED. T ese companies are now bene% ting in a win-win scenario that is attracting follow-on investors. Versant Ventures recently brought to Montreal Inception Sciences "its booming startup factory" because of "the strong capabilities that exist" there (13) .
Like Montreal, the Geneva area has bene-% ted from its urban setting and academic and medical institutions. Having benefactors who saw an opportunity in adversity and stepped in to help did not hurt either. T e experiment is still unfolding, but the results already achieved are encouraging. Merck KGaA's decision to create a venture fund in order to help with the transition was another important step in rallying community support. Ultimately, as in Montreal, it was a combination of public and private funding as well as initiative that allowed the community to adjust, while keeping scientists engaged.
THE LESSONS
Business disruptions happen and should be allowed to run their course. T ey are an essential part of the creative destruction that rejuvenates industries and makes for a vibrant economy. Policy responses are o$ en guided by a laissez-faire attitude or by initiatives undertaken on behalf of the incumbents in order to preserve the status quo. T is analysis of the ongoing disruption of the pharmaceutical industry suggests that a response that cuts across the ideological divide leads to better outcomes. Part of the reason is that collaboration among stakeholders helps preserve the fabric of the community and keeps scientists creating. Networks are an essential part of the innovation process (3) and, once disrupted, can take a long time to rebuild. During that time, little happens: Innovation slacks, the cluster loses its sheen, young scientists are tempted to go elsewhere, and investors % nd fewer opportunities to engage their capital. If the situation is well managed, however, that transition can be a potent source of competitive advantage. Montreal's quick rebound is a case in point. Not only has it kept its scientists busy, it has made it easier to translate their breakthrough ideas into commercial products, thanks to the networks, capital, and facilities of ered by CQDM and NEOMED. Although other geographical areas continue to struggle to adjust, Montreal-and Geneva-are powering ahead.
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